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Abstract
This note discusses the welfare implications of the phenomenon
that the long-term response to a tax reform is often _much stronger
than the impact in the short run. As a polar case a beneficial revenue-
neutral reform is considered whereby the tax is increased on the con-
sumption of a commodity that is fixed in the short run, but flexible in
the long run. The message of this note is that the welfare gain may be
greater in the short run. The reason is that the larger long-term re-
. sponse can be socially undesirable because it represents a distortionary
effect.
1 Introduction
There are at least two reasons why a tax reform may have long-run effects
that differ from the short-run effects. There may be transition costs and
administrative costs involved in implementing a tax reform. These costs
will have an impact only in the short run. And the behavioural response of
economic agents may be different in the long run than in the short run. In
the present context I shall abstract from the former category, and focus on
differences in economic behaviour. 1
A typical case is that changes that are possible in the long run are not
feasible in the short run. A striking example is the composition of capital.
In the short run a stock of capital may be considered as fixed, determined.
by investment decisions of the past. A tax on the capital will have no imme-
diate impact on the stock of capital, but will only affect the rate at which it
is accumulated or allowed to depreciate, and hence the future stock of capi-
tal. Let us now have a case of this sort in mind. To make things simple we
may think of the stock of capital as a durable consumption good, housing
for instance. Our focus is then on the trade-off between this consumption
and consumption of other goods, while we abstract from total savings. As-
sume that historically the tax on this category has been too low from the
point of view of long-run optimum taxation taking the elasticities of long-
run behaviour into account. A reform which increases this tax is therefore
launched. 2 To isolate a pure change in the tax structure, other taxes are
assumed to be adjusted to keep total tax revenue unchanged.
An interesting question is then whether the long-run or short-run benefit
from the tax reform is the stronger one. A more specific reason why the
question is interesting is that in many analyses the economic variables are
assumed to adjust instantaneously so that there is no difference between the
short-run and the long-run effect. This is usually the case when general equi-
librium models are used to estimate the welfare gains from a tax reform. (For
a survey of the use of general equilibrium models, see e.g. Shoven and Whal-
ley (1984)). An equilibrium of a long-run type is assumed to be established
immediately in the wake of the reform. This is a useful simplification. But
it would also be useful to know whether the welfare gain is over- or underes-
timated. If the short-run effect on welfare is lower than the long-run effect,
then clearly the welfare gain is overestimated if the long-run equilibrium is
assumed to be effective immediately.
It seems that the long-run effect is often assumed to be the stronger
one. The reason is that the purpose of a tax reform is to -change the way in
which economic behaviour is affected by taxes, and hence the allocation of
resources. The new effects are believed to be less adverse than those of the
old system. Then it is tempting to believe that if behaviour in the short run
is changed less away from the initial one, welfare is also increased less in the
short run. But this is a too simple argument.
To understand why, it is important to observe that even though the long-
run response to the new tax system is less adverse than the long-run response
to the old system, it is not clear that the long-run response to the new system
is less distorted than the short-run response to this new system. And it is this
comparison which is relevant when comparing short and long term welfare
gains.
An analysis of this problem is presented in Section 2 and illustrated with
a numerical example in Section 3. A brief concluding comment is given in
Section 4.
2 An informal analytical discussion
A simple economic framework may bring out more precisely the structure of
arguments. Let us assume that the problem is to choose the composition of
consumption in each period. Assume further that there are three commodi-
ties. There is an untaxed commodity which is used as the numeraire. The
quantity is denoted by xo . There is a taxed commodity of which the quantity
consumed, x 1 , can be changed immediately. Finally, there is a taxed com-
modity of which the consumption, x2 , can only be changed in the long run.
Let the unit tax rates be denoted by ti and t2 , respectively.
Let us suppose that initially commodity 2 has been taxed at a too low
rate, while commodity 1 has been taxed too harshly as compared to the long-
run optimum. A tax reform is launched whereby t2 is changed immediately to
the optimum value. One will then set the value of t 1 so that the government's
tax revenue requirement is satisfied. For this purpose different values of t 1
are required in the short run and in the long run since the tax proceeds from
commodity 2 will change over time as x2 is adjusted. It will presumably be
the effect of the tax reform to reduce the consumption of commodity 2. But
this will only happen in the long run as x 2 is fixed in the short run.
Let us now consider the welfare effects that are relevant in the short run
and-in the long run. To start with itsis 'useful to note that because of the
taxes there is a distortion between x 1 and xo and between x2 and xo . The
implication is that an increase in x 1 or x 2 at the expense of xo will increase
welfare. Hence the primary purpose of a tax reform cannot be to reduce
X 2 , but rather to incre6,se x l . By assumption the initial distortion between
x i and xo is too big while the distortion between x 2 and xo is too small
by the standards of optimum second best taxation. It is by changing the
relative distortions that a welfare gain can be achieved. Hence a welfare gain
is obtained in the long run not because x 2 is reduced, but because x 1 will
increase sufficiently to dominate the adverse effect of a reduction in x 2 .
This latter effect is an inescapable part of the reform. The partially
beneficial aspect of this effect is that when x 2 is reduced resources are made
available for the desired increase in x l .
In the short run the crucial thing is that some of the tax burden is shifted
from x 1 to x2 to stimulate x 1 without lowering x 2 . Since x 2 remains at the
higher level in the short run, the taxation of this commodity also contributes
more to the tax revenue in the short run. This effect makes it possible to
keep a lower tax on x 1 in the short run. Hence there is a stronger incentive
for substitution from xo to x 1 in the short run, and because of the initial
distortion this is a beneficial effect. It may now seem that the positive effects
on welfare are always stronger in the short run since x 2 is not reduced and
there is a stronger incentive to increase x i . But we cannot be sure that
the consumer's willingness to substitute x 1 for xo is as strong as when x 2 is
allowed to vary. If there is a weaker response to a stronger incentive the net
effect is ambiguous.
3 A numerical example
I shall present a very simple numerical example. A single consumer with a
fixed endowment of resources is considered. The consumer is conceived of as
the representative agent of a large population of homogeneous individuals.
The resource endowment can be transformed into three different goods at
constant rates of transformation. One good cannot be taxed while the two
remaining goods are taxable. A unit tax is imposed on each of these goods.
The goods are consumed in quantities xo , x l , and x2 , respectively. Corn-
modity 0 is the numeraire which is untaxed. By proper normalizations the
pretax prices of all three commodities are set equal to unity. The tax rates
are denoted by t i and t2 and the consumer prices by qo , qi and q2 , where
qo = 1, and
= 1 + ti i = 1, 2.	 (1)
The resource endowment is denoted by y and the tax revenue requirement
by r. It follows that
y = xo qi x i q2 x2 ,
and
r = t i xi t2x2 .





u = a() log xo -F ai log xi -F a2 log x2 ,	 (4)
where the a's are positive coefficients and ao ai a2 = 1. The Cobb-
Douglas specification is chosen to make the numerical example as simple
as possible, but is not essential for the general conclusion of the analysis.
The assumption of constant rates of transformation, implying that producer
prices are constant, is also a simplifying assumption that I shall not comment
on in this short note.
3.1 The initial and long-term situation
As usual in normative tax analysis optimization at two levels is considered.
There is a private optimization and a government optimization. The private •
optimization is to maximize the utility function (4) subject to the budget
constraint (2) taking consumer prices as given:
max u w.r.t. x0 , x 1 and x 2 subject to y = xo 	-f- q2x2
This leads to the demand functions
x i 	ai y 1	 i = 0,1,2,	 (5)
and the indirect utility function
v = E ai log ai + log y — al log q — a2 log q	 (6)
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We may note that the consumer is not concerned with the tax revenue re-
quirement.- It is the responsibility of the . government to set tax parameters
and thereby prices so that the requirement is met.
Three situations will be considered. Initially the consumer is optimally
adjusted to the initial tax system. Then a tax reform is carried out, and
in the long run the consumer will respond optimally to an optimum tax
system. The short run after the tax reform will be described below. The
relation between the tax rates is written as
t2 = Oil 	— ,	 (7)
so that
	
q2 =Oqi , 	(8)
where 0 is a positive parameter. The initial tax system is characterized by a
value of 0 equal to Cs° that is not assumed to be optimal. The optimum tax
structure is the one that solves the problem of maximizing the consumer's
indirect utility function subject to the tax revenue constraint (3):
max v	 ti and t2 s.t. r = tixi i2X2 and (5).
As is well known the optimum tax system with the utility function (4) is
characterized by uniform taxation so that 0 = 1. (See e.g. Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1980, lecture 12).)
Making use of (1), (2), (3), (5), (7) and (8), we find that
	r a2y(1 — 0)/0 
ti — 	(9)(ai a2 )y — r
Then t2 follows from (7), and
=
(°1 a2)Y a2Y( 1 eVe Val + a2 /0) 




(ai a2)Y — r •
The values at the initial tax system and the optimum system are found by
setting 0 = 0° and 0 = 1, respectively. In the latter case we find that the
long-run utility level at optimum taxation is
(ai a2)Y 
v* =-  E ai log a i -I- log y — (ai -F a2 ) log
ai a2 )y — r
(10)
12)
3.2 Comparison with the short run
Now we want to compare this situation with the situation prevailing in the
short run after the tax reform. The following assumptions are then made to
distinguish between the short run and the long run. In the short run x2 is
fixed, while xo and x 1 can be adjusted instantaneously. This means that in
the short run x2 = x?, which was the optimal value of x 2 under the initial
tax system. From (5) and (11) we have that
,ro a ,,(ai a2)Y — r ==
-2 	2'7 ((Pa l -F a2 )y
Let the symbols nought, bar and asteriks indicate initial values, short-run
values and long-run values of variables, respectively. By the tax reform the
new long-run optimum value of t2 is introduced, so that f2 .t.;. Since we
consider a pure structural change with the tax revenue being the same in all
periods, the short run value of ti, must be the one that satisfies the tax
revenue requirement
r	 t;x.	 (14)
The tax rate i is a temporary one which is different from both t? and
With x2 fixed the expenditure left for buying xo and x 1 is y — and
the consumer will maximize utility subject to this budget constraint. Hence
the private optimization problem in this case is
max u w.r.t. xo and x 1 s.t. xo 	y — q;x2 and x =
It follows that the optimum value of x 1 is
ai(y - q;x?)x i =
41(ao
(15)
Also using that 41 = 1 + Ii , (14) and (15) can be solved for fi and -41 , and
we get
(ao	 t;x(3)
a (y — q2 x2) — (ao a i)(r t2 3
ai(Y — *3)






Then from (15) 





Let us now consider the following numerical example:
ao = 0.4 y = 100
= 0.3 r = 30
a2 = 0.3	 00 = 0.5
Using (12) we get
v* = 1.347 when log 10 1
The short run utility level is
= ao log -±o -F al log	 a2 log x












Thus the short-run utility level is higher than the long-run utility level. To
obtain the same utility level in the long run an increase in the long run
resource endowment of approximately 4 percent would be required.
4 Conclusion
This note has discussed some aspects of long-run effects as opposed to short-
run effects of a tax reform. As example has been used the following case.
A commodity is taxed too leniently by optimum second best standards. By
a reform the tax is increased, but the quantity consumed is inelastic in the
short run, while respoliding to the tax reform in the long run. Other taxes are
adapted to keep total tax revenue constant both in the short run and in the
long run. It was demonstrated that the favourable effect on welfare may very
well be greater in the short run than in the long run. This may be a useful
message as the opposite conclusion may appear more appealing to intuition.
It is the purpose of a tax reform to change the allocation of resources. A
short-term constraint on adjustments may appear undesirable from this point
of view. On the other hand the private response to taxes is usually socially
undesirable. This is in fact the basic reason for tax distortions. That the
private response is constrained in the short run can therefore make it socially
preferable to the complete adjustment that is possible in the long run.
The consumption bundle that each consumer is stuck with in the short
run is not optimal from a private point of view when the consumer becomes
free to change his consumption. This means that taking prices as given, the
consumer can achieve a higher utility level by selecting a different consump-
tion bundle. But when everybody does that, a different tax policy must be
chosen to maintain the tax revenue, and prices will change. The consumer
may then eventually find himself worse off when choosing the best available
consumption bundle at the new prices. We should observe that this outcome
is neither due to stupidity nor ignorance on the part of the consumer. Even
if each consumer is perfectly aware of what will happen, it is not rational
for each single individual to behave differently. The micro behaviour is per-
fectly rational when each consumer cannot influence the decisions of others.
By unilateral action each consumer can only make himself worse off without
preventing a suboptimal social outcome.
No general conclusion has been drawn about how short-run welfare effects
of a tax reform compare with long-run effects. The special features of each
reform have to be analyzed. The purpose has rather been to contribute to
the general insight into the nature of second best tax reforms.
Footnotes
1. As a third catecory we might list the case in which the very purpose of the
tax reform is to change the trade-off between the short run and the long
run, for instance by encouraging savings. In that case the difference
between the short run and the long run is trivial. The whole idea of
the tax reform is that by sacrificing some consumption and welfare in
the short run, a more than compensating gain will be attained in the
long run. The concern of this paper is the allocation in each period
rather than the intertemporal one. The focus is on the composition of
capital and consumption.
2. Two alternative options might have been considered. The government
might have declared that the tax will only be raised at some date in
the future, and the economic agents would respond to that decision
from now on. Such a tax reform would essentially be a preannounced
future reform and would not entail the kind of distinction between the
short run and long run that will be addressed in this paper. Even more
important is that this is not the normal way a tax reform is introduced
in practice even though the decision process and preparations may take
some time.
A different option would be to levy a temporary high tax, while an-
nouncing that the future tax will be set at a low rate. Such a policy
would exploit the differences between short term and long term elas-
ticities as prescribed by optimum tax theory. However, such a policy
would neither be dynamically consistent nor credible.
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